University at Buffalo School of Law

Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law
Journal Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2006

Free Wage Labor and The Suffrage in Nineteenth Century England
Robert J. Steinfeld
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert J. Steinfeld, Free Wage Labor and The Suffrage in Nineteenth Century England, 123 Z Savigny Stift
Rechtsgesch Ger Abt 266 (2006).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/journal_articles/589

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

Artikel

Free Wage Labor and The Suffrage in Nineteenth
Century England
Steinfeld, Robert J.
in: Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für
Rechtsgeschichte / Germanistische Abteilung |
Zeitschrift d...
17 Seite(n) ([267] - 283)

----------------------------------------------------Nutzungsbedingungen
DigiZeitschriften e.V. gewährt ein nicht exklusives, nicht übertragbares, persönliches und beschränktes Recht auf Nutzung dieses
Dokuments. Dieses Dokument ist ausschließlich für den persönlichen, nicht kommerziellen Gebrauch bestimmt. Das Copyright bleibt bei
den Herausgebern oder sonstigen Rechteinhabern. Als Nutzer sind Sie sind nicht dazu berechtigt, eine Lizenz zu übertragen, zu
transferieren oder an Dritte weiter zu geben.
Die Nutzung stellt keine Übertragung des Eigentumsrechts an diesem Dokument dar und gilt vorbehaltlich der folgenden
Einschränkungen:
Sie müssen auf sämtlichen Kopien dieses Dokuments alle Urheberrechtshinweise und sonstigen Hinweise auf gesetzlichen Schutz
beibehalten; und Sie dürfen dieses Dokument nicht in irgend einer Weise abändern, noch dürfen Sie dieses Dokument für öffentliche
oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, aufführen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen; es sei denn, es liegt Ihnen
eine schriftliche Genehmigung von DigiZeitschriften e.V. und vom Herausgeber oder sonstigen Rechteinhaber vor.
Mit dem Gebrauch von DigiZeitschriften e.V. und der Verwendung dieses Dokuments erkennen Sie die Nutzungsbedingungen an.

Terms of use
DigiZeitschriften e.V. grants the non-exclusive, non-transferable, personal and restricted right of using this document. This document is
intended for the personal, non-commercial use. The copyright belongs to the publisher or to other copyright holders. You do not have the
right to transfer a licence or to give it to a third party.
Use does not represent a transfer of the copyright of this document, and the following restrictions apply:
You must abide by all notices of copyright or other legal protection for all copies taken from this document; and You may not change this
document in any way, nor may you duplicate, exhibit, display, distribute or use this document for public or commercial reasons unless you
have the written permission of DigiZeitschriften e.V. and the publisher or other copyright holders.
By using DigiZeitschriften e.V. and this document you agree to the conditions of use.

Kontakt / Contact
DigiZeitschriften e.V.
Papendiek 14
37073 Goettingen
Email: info@digizeitschriften.de

Free Wage Labor and The Suffrage
in Nineteenth Century England
Vo n

Robert J. Steinfeld
Summary: I. Introduction: Conflicting Historical Narratives; 2. Penal Enforcement
of Wage Labor Agreements in Nineteenth Century England; 3. The Economics of
Coercion In Wage Labor; 4. The Importance of An Expanded Suffrage In Ending The
Use of Penal Pressure In Wage Labor; 5. Conclusion: Free Markets and Free Wage
Labor?

1. In t r o d u c t i o n: Co n f l i c t ing Hi s t o r i c a l Nar r a t i v e s:
Over recent decades the master historical narrative of modem slavery has
largely been rewritten 1 ). Today, most historians accept the idea that modern
slavery did not disappear because physical coercion proved unprofitable in
extracting slave labor services2 ). They believe that slavery disappeared be
cause states compelled employers of slave labor to give up the practice, even
while it continued to generate large profits. Yet while the master historical
narrative of slavery has been largely rewritten, the same cannot be said about
the master historical narrative of wage labor. Surprisingly, the latter narra
tive continues to rely on the traditional notion that Anglo-American waged
labor over the last few centuries was free labor because employers shunned
physical coercion as an unprofitable method for extracting labor services. The
underlying economic logic of the free wage labor narrative is the same logic
that has been discredited as a basis for understanding the history of modern
slavery. Yet, while the slavery narrative has been transformed, the traditional
free wage labor narrative endures.
1)

Time On The Cross: The Economics of American Negro Slavery (1974), by
Robe r t F o g e l and St a n l ey E n g e r m a n was the book that initiated this reap
praisal.
2) See, for example, Ir a Be r l i n, Many Thousands Gone (1998), and Phi l ip
M o r g a n, Slave Counterpoint (1998).
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The dominant view among historians continues to be that waged labor has
been free labor in England and America at least since the eighteenth century
simply because the market, rather than other more direct means of coercion,
completely satisfied the economic needs of employers. Depending upon one's
political perspective, market incentives or market pressures are thought to
have worked perfectly well to supply employers with cheap, efficient wage
labor. Indeed, bodily compulsion3 ) is assumed to have been costly and to have
produced sullen, inefficient workers. The free labor narrative with its underly
ing assumption about the economic inefficiency of bodily coercion has a long
history, dating back in its modem form to the eighteenth century'). During the
last decade of that century, for example, Joseph Townsend wrote that

Legal constraint is attended with much trouble, violence and noise; creates ill will,
and never can be productive of good and acceptable service; whereas hunger is not
only peaceable, silent, unremitting pressure, but, as the most natural motive to industry
and labor, it calls forth the most powerful exertions; . . . The slave must be compelled
to work but the free man should be left to his own judgment and discretion; should be
protected in the full enjoyment of his own, be it much or little; and punished when he
invades his neighbor's property5).

During the same period in which Townsend wrote, Adam Smith offered a
more positive version of the factors that made free labor more efficient that
coerced labor. Coercion, he argued, gave workers little incentive to produce
efficiently. "Whatever work [a slave does] can be squeezed out of him by
violence only, and not by any interest of his own"6). By contrast free workers
have "a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as possible,
in order that their own proportion may be so" 7). Even today such views carry
great weight. Recently, for example, one survey of economic literature ob
served that "[e]lementary economic reasoning suggests that in the long run

3) By bodily compulsion, I mean compulsion that involves physical violence, bodi
ly confinement, loss of bodily freedom of movement, or threats of such consequences.
I contrast bodily compulsion, for the purpose of the argument here, to economic or
pecuniary compulsion that involves deprivation of property or income. For a fuller
discussion of this issue, see R ob e r t S t e i n fe l d , Coercion, Contract and Free Labor
(2001), 1-29, 308-311.
4) A. W. C o a t s , "Changing Attitudes to Labour in the Mid-Eighteenth Century,"
Economic History Review, 2nd ser., XI ( 1958).
5) Jos e p h To w n s e n d , "A Dissertation on the Poor Laws" quoted in Da v i d
B r i o n D a v i s , The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (1975),
358-59.
6
) Ada m S m i th , Wealth of Nations (Edwn Cannan, ed., 1976), Book III, Ch. II,
411-412.
7) Ibid., p. 413.
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the institution ofslavery is unviable economically ... As a slave receives only
a fraction ofhis marginal product, enough to cover productive consumption,
he has fewer incentives to work hard than ifhe were to internalize his entire
marginal product as free workers do"8).
Modem historians have produced additional arguments showing that un
coerced labor has proved to be economically superior to coerced labor. A
number ofAmerican historians, for example, have argued that American em
ployers spontaneously turned away from indentured servitude and toward
free wage labor during the late eighteenth century because they found inden
tured labor more costly than free labor, since it committed them to support
their indentured workers during increasingly common economic downtums9).
Another historian has argued that bound labor was abolished in the Scottish
coal mines during the last quarter ofthe eighteenth century because powerful
mine owners wished to gain unimpeded access to the limited pool ofskilled
Scottish coal miners, and agitated for the abolition of bound labor in order
to do so 10).
The dominance ofthis kind ofreasoning has left historians with little mo
tive to look for examples ofthe use ofbodily coercion in the history ofwage
labor. And by and large historians have not found what they did not go looking
for. The historical picture ofwage labor today takes for granted, in the main,
that wage work has not traditionally been subject to direct forms ofcoercion,
indeed it is almost considered a contradiction in terms to think that it could
have been.
What is strange about the enduring power of this wage labor narrative
is that historians of slavery no longer accept the proposition, by and large,
that bodily coercion cannot produce highly productive labor. On the contrary,
historians ofmodem slavery are now widely agreed that bodily coercion, or
bodily coercion combined with incentives, did produce labor that was even
more productive than wage labor in certain settings, and in other settings, ur
ban artisanal work for example, at least as productive as waged labor.
To be sure, over the last 25 years there has been a general reassessment
of the efficacy ofcoercion in labor relations, and historians have discovered
8)
9)

Thr a i n n Eggertsson, Economic B ehavior and Institutions (1990), 205.
Sha ron Sal inger, 'To Serve Well and Faithfully,' Labor and Indentured Ser
vants in Pennsylvania, 1682-1800(1987), 149-52; Gar y Nash, The Urban Crucible
(1979), 320.
10) C hristophe r W ha t l e y, "'The Fettering Bonds o f Brotherhood': Combina
tion and Labour Relations in the ScottishCoal-MiningIndustry, c. 1690-1775", Social
History 12 (May, 1987).
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much more coerced labor in the world than they had previously thought ex
isted. That bodily coercion cannot produce highly productive, profitable la
bor is no longer accepted as a universal rule of labor relations. But historians
have been reluctant to embrace the opposite proposition, that bodily coercion
might have been economically advantageous for employers in a wide variety
of labor market settings. Instead, they have strained to define precisely those
market conditions under which bodily coercion could prove economically ad
vantageous, and to distinguish them from the more typical market conditions
under which employers would not have found bodily coercion beneficial'').
This is a complicated story, but in general a tacit consensus has emerged
that in places in which labor was relatively abundant, as in the fully developed
wage labor markets of the metropolitan core of England and the United States,
bodily coercion was economically unnecessary, indeed even counterproduc
tive. As a result coerced labor has come to be viewed mainly as a phenom
enon of the global periphery (where labor markets were thin), and of certain
forms of agricultural production (in which working conditions were particu
larly onerous). For all the progress that has been made in understanding how
widely coerced labor was used, the view that bodily coercion can be of great
benefit in extracting labor services has not generally been seen to apply to the
case of wage labor in the English and American metropolitan core.
2. Pe n a l Enforcement of Wa g e Lab o r Agreements i n Ni ne
teenth Cen t u r y E n g l a n d:
The narrative of free wage labor endures, by and large, despite the fact that
as long ago as 1954 Daphne Simon demonstrated unequivocally that penal
pressure was, in fact, used quite widely against wage workers in nineteenth
England 12 ). One would have thought the rediscovery that under the English
Master and Servant acts wage workers had regularly been imprisoned at hard
labor for violating their work agreements, in the nation that stood at the fore
front of free market industrialization, might have led to a rethinking of the
master historical narrative of wage labor 13 ). But it did not. And one impor
tant reason it did not was that Simon herself interpreted the English practice
11
) For one of the best attempts to identify these different labor market conditions
see Evs e y D o mar, "The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: A Hypothesis", Journal of
Economic History 30 (March, 1970).
1 2) D a p hne Simon, "Master and Servant", in Democracy and the Labour Move
ment: Essays in Honour of Dona Torr (J o h n S av i lie , ed., 1954).
1
3) 4 Geo. IV, c. 34 (1823). Most skilled English workers were not employees at
will, but served under agreements that bound them for shorter or longer terms of ser
vice or called for them to give several weeks or a month's notice before leaving.
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through the lens of a Marxist version of the free wage labor narrative. She
subscribed to the view that modem capitalism relied on the dull compulsion
of economic relations to extract labor services. Other forms of coercion like
the penal coercion authorized by the Master and Servant acts were relics of a
feudal stage of development, and doomed to extinction because they no lon
ger served the economic interests of modem capitalist employers. She thought
that the Master and Servant acts might have been of some help to small, back
ward employers, but as the economy modernized the acts became less and less
useful. As soon as organized labor began to protest, she argued, the employ
ing classes simply abandoned the acts, putting up only symbolic resistance.
Thus Simon, who was the first to rediscover how extensively penal pressure
had been used in English wage labor as late as 1875, dismissed its economic
importance, relegating it to a marginal role in the history of wage labor.
A second important reason her discovery had practically no impact on the
larger historical narrative of wage labor was that no one seemed able to say
precisely what economic benefits employers derived by using penal pres
sures against wage workers. And without such an explanation, there was no
basis for calling into question the economic logic upon which the free labor
narrative rested: wage labor has been free labor simply because employers
found bodily coercion unprofitable. Yet the stubborn fact remained that in
the years between 1857 and 1875 (years for which there are comprehensive
statistics available) English employers frequently used penal pressure against
their wage workers. About 10,000 English workers each year on average were
prosecuted for misbehavior at work, or for leaving work before their agree
ment entitled them to 14). Until 1867, about 1,500 workers, on average, were
imprisoned each year, but a large percentage of the 10,000 or so workers who
were prosecuted each year, but not imprisoned, were forced back to work
under the threat of imprisonment 15 ).
Recently, historians have begun to devote more attention to the Master and
Servant acts. A number of new studies of the acts have now been published,
and a consensus has emerged that Simon's view that the acts were economi
cally anachronistic is simply wrong' 6). But none of these studies has managed
14

) Judicial Statistics, England and Wales, 1857-1875, 19 vols. (1858-1876) and
Simon, "Master and Servant," op. cit. n. 12.
1 5) "In one small sample from Preston and surrounding towns in Lancashire during
1865-66, I've found that 54% of those prosecuted were ordered back to work under
threat of imprisonment, while only 17% of those prosecuted were actually given a
prison term" (Marc W. Steinberg, unpublished manuscript in author's possession).
16) See, for example, Douglas Hay, "Penal Sanctions, Masters and Servants" (Un-
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to identify precisely what economic benefits employers derived by using pe
nal pressure against wage workers. As a result, even though the widespread
use of penal pressure in English wage labor is now well documented, there
has been no direct challenge to the economic logic that underlies the larger
free wage labor narrative.
As a result historians today subscribe to two master historical narratives
of labor based on contradictory views about the economic efficacy of bodily
coercion. The slavery narrative is based on the idea that bodily coercion of
labor was of great economic benefit to employers, and that they relinquished
it only when the state, for political and moral reasons, compelled them to do
so. The other narrative, the wage labor narrative, holds just the opposite, that
bodily coercion of labor produced sullen, inefficient workers, and employers
of waged labor avoided using it. According to this narrative, free wage labor
was the spontaneous result of the operation of employer interests in free mar
kets, rather than a product of political intervention.
But by now it is clear that the traditional wage labor narrative does not
fit the facts very well. In particular, it does not account for what we know
about the widespread use of penal pressure in nineteenth century English
wage labor. Nevertheless, if this long established narrative is to be definitive
ly overturned, it is necessary to show that its economic rationale is flawed.
It is necessary to demonstrate that employers of waged labor derived real
economic benefits by using penal pressure in a variety of market settings. If
this can be shown, then factors other than the economic interests of employ
ers must have been responsible for the ultimate disappearance of this type
of coercive power over wage labor. Such a demonstration opens up the pos
sibility, moreover, that, as in the case of slavery, state intervention, rather
than market forces, led to the elimination of an otherwise profitable form of
coercive power.
3. T h e E c o n o m i c s o f Coe r c i o n I n Wag e La b o r:
Transaction costs analysis, developed in recent decades by neo-institutional
economists, helps to identify precisely what economic benefits employers of
waged labor derived from the use of penal pressure. This analysis must begin
with wages. Institutional economists have shown that neither hourly wages
nor piece-work wages completely eliminates the need for supervision (and
hence supervision costs) in waged labor. Employers of waged labor face supublished manuscript, 1990); and Hay, "Masters, Servants, Justices and Judges" (Un
published manuscript,1988); D. C. Woods, "The Operation of the Master and Ser
vants Act in the Black Country, 1858-1875," Midland History 7 (1982).
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pervision problems that are not completely unlike those faced by slave own
ers. "Owners had the choice," Yoram Barze! writes, "between supervising
their slaves' output [as to quantity and quality], which is comparable to what
employers have to do when the free workers they employ work by the piece,
and supervising their effort, which is comparable to what employers have to
do when they employ free workers by the hour" 17). Because the interests of
waged workers cannot be perfectly aligned with the interests of their employ
ers through the payment of wages, employers inevitably incur supervision
costs in the course of production.
These costs are of two kinds, costs of supervision to enforce effort or guar
antee quality, and residual costs of reduced output or low quality that cannot
be eliminated because the added costs of supervision necessary to eliminate
them will be higher than the improvement in quality and increase in produc
tion such increased supervision can be expected to generate. Threats of dis
missal can certainly raise the costs of shirking to workers, and may help to
control supervision costs, but dismissal is not always a good option for em
ployers. Where waged labor is skilled and labor markets are tight, the threat
of dismissal loses much of its power.
Unemployment among skilled workers in England has been estimated to
have been below 4% in 11 of the 15 years between 1860 and 1875 18 ). But
where sloppiness or loafing at work can lead to a prison term at hard labor,
through the use of an inexpensive, summary legal process, the prospect of in
carceration at hard labor must certainly raise the expected cost of shirking to
workers, at little additional cost to employers, yielding both less shirking and
lower supervision costs. At a time when supervision strategies in many indus
tries were not well developed, these advantages were probably substantial.
There are numerous examples in the records of English employers prose
cuting workers because they failed to work as well or as hard as was expected.
"George Heywood of West Bromwich", for example,

was a bundler at the furnace of an iron works with both puddlers and millmen depen
dent upon him. Because he left his labour for a few hours, "the work was very much
in arrears and other men were idle." He was given the option of paying £5 damages
or having two months in prison and remarked that "he would have to have the two
months" 19).

Yo ram B a rze I, Economic Analysis of Property Rights (1989), 80.
Wil l i a m B e v e r i dge, Full Employment in a Free Society, 2d ed. (London
1960), Appendix A; see also A. C. P i g ou, Industrial Fluctuations, 2d ed. (London
1929), Appendix, Table I.
19
) D. C. Wo ods, "The Operation of the Master and Servants Act in the Black
Country," 105.
17
)
18)
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A puddler working the night shift at an iron works in Walsall, Staffordshire
left iron in the furnace overnight where it spoiled, causing his employer sub
stantial damage. He was given a twenty-one day sentence2°). George Odger, a
bootmaker in the putting out system testified in the 1860s that

Any decent man ... is apt to be terrified with the thought that his employer would feel
disposed to have him before a magistrate for [a] breach ofcontract ... I think it would
be about two months ago ... I went over the time [for returning finished work], the
first time I ever did in my life; [my employer] called at my house when I was out and
threatened that ifhe had not the work in a given time he would proceed against me in
the ordinary way for breach of contract. I went home and then went to the workshop
and worked nearly all night to get the work to him the next day, which embarrassed
me a good deal because I had been at work all the day before. I do not know whether
he would have carried out his threat or not, but I was within his clutches if I did not
make the boots21).

A summary criminal penalty for breaches oflabor agreements also helped
employers to lower other types ofcosts. Turnover costs are the costs an em
ployer must bear when a worker leaves his job. One ofthe most significant
elements ofturnover costs is often the cost oflost output between the depar
ture ofa worker and his subsequent replacement. But an employer must also
frequently bear search costs and training costs. Turnover is far from costless
in the case of skilled labor, even in thick labor markets, and may be especially
high when labor markets are tight. In England in the years between 1857 and
1875, employers prosecuted workers under the Master and Servant acts much
more frequently when unemployment was low than when it was high, and as
noted, unemployment was often very low in this period22). There is abundant
evidence from the period that employers commonly used contracts ofa fort
night or a month to regulate turnover, to prevent workers from leaving sud
denly, possibly disrupting production, and to give themselves time to locate
replacement workers. Ifa worker was not free to leave immediately but was
required to give two weeks' or a month's notice, by the time he was free to
leave other offers ofemployment might no longer remain open and in those
cases turnover costs might be avoided altogether.
In addition, a well timed policy of signing skilled workers to criminally
enforceable labor contracts ofa year or several years, which employers com
monly did during this period, might have helped to lower labor costs in yet
20) Ibid.
) Testimony of George Odger before the "Select Committee on Master and Ser
vant" (1866), XIII, Q. 1813.
22
) R obert S t e infeld, Coercion, Contract and Free Laborin the Nineteenth Cen
tury (2001), 75-77.
21
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another way, by slowing the rate of wage increases during periods of low
unemployment. Workers bound by a criminally enforceable contract were
obligated to work for the wages they had originally agreed upon, even if in a
tight labor market wages subsequently rose. Unemployment was extremely
low in 1864 and 1865, for example, and employers in the pottery trade began
to try to impose annual contracts on their workmen. One potter complained
that "seeing that trade is now in a prosperous state, that long period of agree
ment takes from the workman the power of raising the price of his labour"23).
In June, 1865 a worker named Clarke signed a two year contract to work for
a cutlery manufacturer. In November, Clarke left and Unwin, his employer,
prosecuted him for contract breach. Clarke answered that "he had applied to
[his employer] to make an advance in his wages in the same manner that the
large majority of the cutlery manufacturers in Sheffield had recently done
to their hired workmen, which the appellants had refused to do, and in con
sequence thereof he had felt himself justified in refusing to work for them
at the low rate ofwages"24). In 1865 skilled unemployment hovered around
2% 25). The magistrates warned Clarke that the contract prices could not be
raised except by mutual consent, that Unwin was unwilling to agree to an in
crease, and that Clarke must return to work at the old prices or be imprisoned.
Clarke answered that he would rather be sent to prison than go back to work
at the original prices. The justices obliged, sentencing Clarke to 21 days at
hard labor. When he was released, he returned to Unwin to retrieve his tools,
but Unwin insisted that Clarke was still obligated to work out his contract at
the original prices. Clarke refused and was prosecuted again. The court ruled
that he could be imprisoned a second time, and at this point Clarke had had
enough, deciding to return to work on the original terms26).
It is true that there were disadvantages as well as advantages for employ
ers in this system of criminally enforceable labor contracts. In tight labor
markets the system might make it more difficult for an employer to obtain
skilled labor. In slack labor markets he might have to worry about contrac
tual obligations he had undertaken in more prosperous times. But taken all
together employers derived considerable economic benefits from their power
2 3)

"Select Committee on Master and Servant" (1866) XIII, Q. 1410.
Unwin v. Clarke, l L.R. 417 (1866), 418.
25
) For estimates of skilled unemployment rates, see Beve r i dge, Full Employ
ment in a Free Society, Appendix A; and Pigo u , Industrial Fluctuations, Appendix,
Table I.
26) Unwin v. Clarke, 1 L.R. 417 ( 1866), 418-19; and testimony of William Dron
field before the "Select Committee on Master and Servant" (1866), XIII: Q. 864.
24
)
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criminally to enforce the performance oflabor agreements of various lengths
under which almost all skilled English workers were employed.
The economic benefits of penal coercion explain why employers continued
to prosecute workers under the Master and Servant acts with great enthusiasm
up until almost the moment the acts were repealed. In 1871 unemployment
among skilled workers fell to 1.6%, in 1872 to .9%. In 1873 it rose slightly to
1.2% and in 1874 to 1. 7%27). In 1870 employers prosecuted 8,670 workers in
England and Wales for offences under the Master and Servant acts. In 1871,
however, as unemployment plunged, they prosecuted 10,810 workers, and in
1872 prosecutions soared to 17,082 and then came down slightly in 1873 to
16,230. But in 1875, the very year the Master and Servant acts were repealed,
prosecutions were still at a level of 14,35328 ).
The economic benefits employers derived from using penal pressure also
help to explain why ruling elites did not give up the Master and Servant Acts
without a very long struggle. It took organized British labor almost 15 years of
campaigning before Parliament finally repealed the acts, and over this period
the system of penal coercion continued to be defended tenaciously. Conces
sions were made only grudgingly, and a great deal of effort was expended to
preserve the core practices of the old system for as long as possible29 ). English
27
) B e v e r i d g e and P i g o u, op. cit.
28) Judicial Statistics, England and Wales, 1857-1875, 19 vols. (1858-1876). These
are large numbers but they represent only a small percentage of the laboring popula
tion as a whole, and the question inevitably arises whether the acts were actually ef
fective in accomplishing their goals. We probably can never have a definitive answer
for this question, because on the one hand it is impossible to determine how often
workers violated labor agreements and were not prosecuted, and on the other how
often workers thought about but did not violate labor agreements because they feared
prosecution. These everyday events would not have shown up in prosecution statistics.
For an extended discussion of this problem, see Steinfe ld, Coercion, Contract and
Free Labor, 72-82. But we do have some evidence and it is possible to make some
guesses about the effectiveness of the acts. One Justice of the Peace, who was also an
employer, when asked whether he had resorted to the acts very often answered "No,
not often ... The moral effect of having the power is often sufficient." Testimony befor
the Select Committee on Master and Servant (1866), XIII,Q.1441. We also know that
local newspapers throughout the country reported Master and Servant prosecutions in
their daily or weekly crime columns so that local workmen would have been put on
notice as to who and how many local workers were being made examples of. At the
very least, the acts loomed large enough in the lives of working people to induce them
to undertake an extended political campaign to have them reformed.
29
) For an extended discussion of these parliamentary battles, see S t e in fe l d ,
Coercion, Contract and Free Labor, Ch. 6.
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employers clearly believed that they profited from the use of penal pressure in
wage labor, used such pressure frequently in their dealings with wage work
ers, and resisted efforts to deprive them of the power. The ways in which penal
pressure helped to lower supervision and turnover costs, and keep wages in
check during periods when labor markets was tight, explain why employers
would not have relinquished this power without a struggle. A clear economic
logic existed for the retention of penal pressure in wage labor long after the
advent of industrial capitalism.
In the traditional narrative of free wage labor, employer interests explain
the supposed absence of bodily coercion in wage labor. But it is now clear
not only that English employers continued to utilize penal pressure during
industrialization, but that they did so precisely because they found it profit
able. In fact, English employers did not abandon penal pressure as a natural
consequence of the introduction of freer markets in the nineteenth century.
They were compelled to relinquish it by a political act of the state. In 1875,
Parliament repealed the Master and Servant acts, stripping employers of the
power to use penal pressure. But employers continued to use penal pressure
against wage workers up until the very moment the acts expired.
4. T h e Imp o r t a n c e o f An E x p a n d e d Su ffr a g e In End i n g
T h e Use o f P e n a l P r e s s u r e In Wa ge Lab o r:
It is necessary at this point in the argument to address the question of cau
sation. How was it possible for such a fundamental change in the legal rules
governing wage labor to have been adopted over the objections and in oppo
sition to the economic interests of employers? The answer is a complicated
one, but it is to be found in the realm of political struggle.
In 1867 Parliament passed the Second Reform Act, which greatly expanded
the British suffrage. In the United Kingdom as a whole the number of people
enfranchised nearly doubled, from about 1.3 million to about 2.4 million30).
In many towns the new suffrage gave artisans and laborers a majority of the
vote3 ').
Whatever meaning is attached to the phrase 'working-class', the potential work
ing-class electorate in English and Welsh boroughs in the period immediately after
1867 was probably about.five times the size of the working-class electorate in these
boroughs before, and over a half their total electorate32).
F. B . Smith, The Making of the Second Reform Bill (1966), 236.
R. K. Webb, Modern England (New York, 1970), 326; Smith, Second Re
form Bill, 225.
32
) Maurice Cowling, 1867, Disraeli, Gladstone and Revolution: The Passing
of the Second Reform Bill (1967), 46.
30

31

)

)

278

Robert J. Steinfeld

The expanded suffrage played a critical role in the repeal of the Master and
Servant Acts in 1875, and with them, in the elimination of the power of em
ployers to utilize penal pressure against wage workers. But before discussing
the role an expanded suffrage played in producing this change in the basic
terms of waged labor, it is necessary to say something about why ruling elites
would have expanded the suffrage in the first place.
The best modem authorities reject the Whig interpretation of the passage
of suffrage reform. Neither free market industrialization nor liberal ideas led
inevitably to an expanded electorate.
[Whig historians] see industrial change on the one hand and political change on the
other, and assume a simple, one-way relationship between them. They by-pass, ignore
or explain away both the hostility to change and the power to resist it which analysis
of society at large suggests might be found, not just on one side ofthe House of Com
mons but in most parts of both.
They assume, moreover, a straight progression from the reforms of the 1830s to
the reforms of the 1870s, neglecting the recession in progressive feeling ... The death
of Chartism, the mid-Victorian boom and the hints given, alongside a militant trade
unionism, ofa contented, loyal and royalist working class in some of the larger cities,
produced a sense of political stability and distrust of Radical motion which impreg
nated the social attitude of a great part of the House of Commons. If the Reform bill
of 1867 symbolized the beginning of a period of rapid political change, it did so in a
parliament which not only thought of itself as the ruling assembly of a highly stable
society but was also in strong reaction against any suggestion that it should be oth
erwise33).
During the 1850s and early 1860s a number of attempts to pass suffrage
reform had failed to make any headway in Parliament. Indeed, just a year
earlier, in 1866, a much less radical suffrage reform bill, brought to the floor
by Gladstone and the Liberal Party, went down to defeat in Parliament34).
Ultimately, what led to electoral reform in 1867 was a combination of fac
tors, the most important of which seem to have been the widespread desire
among ruling elites to reach a limited political settlement with the increas
ingly well organized and restive working classes, and a political competition
between Gladstone and Disraeli and the Liberal and Conservative Parties for
electoral advantage in the near term future35). The Reform Bill of 1867 was
brought forward and passed by a Conservative government. While it cannot
be said that the working classes actually forced reform upon Parliament, it
is nevertheless the case that as a result of the defeat of the Liberal suffrage
reform bill in 1866, trade unionists and middle class radicals launched and
33) Ibid., 1-2.
34) Smith , Second Reform Bill, llO.
35) Ibid., 229.
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sustained an out of doors agitation for suffrage reform that lasted nearly a
year until "the borough suffrage provisions of the [original] Conservative Bill
were transformed and safe"36). During this long period mass demonstrations
were held in nearly every major English city sometimes drawing as many as
150,000 people37 ).
The expansion of voting rights played a critical role in the parliamentary
deliberations that led to the elimination of penal coercion in English wage
labor. It is possible to assess the impact of the expansion of the suffrage by
comparing the very different results achieved by two different attempts to
reform the Master and Servant acts that were undertaken within a few years
of each other, one before suffrage reform, the second after.
In the early 1860s trade unionists launched a campaign to reform the Mas
ter and Servant acts. In 1867, almost at the same time that the suffrage Reform
Bill was making its way through Parliament, Parliament was also considering
reforms of the Master and Servant acts. In August of that year Parliament did
pass a Master and Servant reform act. But this first reform act was passed by
a Parliament that had been elected under the old, unreformed suffrage, and
it failed to free working people from the penal pressures to which they had
long been subject.
Lord Elcho, a conservative Whig, introduced the bill that ultimately be
came the first Master and Servant reform act. In 1866 Elcho had voted against
Gladstone's suffrage reform bill because he thought that it did not go far
enough to secure a durable political settlement with the working classes, one
that would guarantee social and economic peace. Thinking that the Conser
vatives would reward him for his role in Gladstone's defeat, he pressed the
new Conservative government in 1867 to bring forward a reform bill for the
Master and Servant acts. But the government refused and Elcho, thinking
that reform of these acts was essential if social peace was to be maintained,
introduced his own member's bill.
The previous session Elcho had chaired a parliamentary committee charged
with studying the issue of the Master and Servant acts. He had been chosen
in part because of his long relationship with trade unionists. An old fashioned
paternalist, he hoped to introduce just enough reform to stabilize old hierar
chies. The trade union agitation of the previous years had convinced him that
it was essential to reform the Master and Servant acts, and his bill went some
distance toward meeting the complaints of organized labor.
) Ibid.
37) Ibid., 139-140.
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Their chief complaint was that criminal compulsion violated the liberal
principle ofequal treatment under law. Employers were not subject to crimi
nal penalties under the Master and Servants acts for breaches oflabor agree
ments on their side, only workers were subject to such sanctions. Moreover,
trade unionists contended, penal sanctions to enforce private agreements rep
resented a total anomaly in contract law. Breach of contract normally only
gave rise to a civil action for damages. Hence, the Master and Servant acts
represented an intolerable example ofclass legislation.
Elcho's bill attempted to address several ofthese objections by making pro
ceedings under the Master and Servant law as nearly civil in nature as seemed
politically possible under the circumstances. In an apparent effort to preserve
the civil nature ofproceedings under a new Master and Servant act, Elcho's
bill established an entirely separate procedure for criminal prosecutions and
indicated that such prosecutions should only be based on acts that were al
ready criminal under the general criminal law. Nevertheless, from a modern
perspective, Elcho's bill was far from ideal. It continued to give employers
the power to seek specific performance oflabor agreements (a civil remedy),
and it by no means entirely abolished the possibility of criminal prosecution
for contract breach.
Nevertheless, when the Elcho bill was introduced into Parliament, it ran
into stiff resistance. Most of the members who spoke thought that reform of
Master and Servant law was necessary but that Elcho's bill went too far. Mr.
Alderman Salomons, for example, said that
he must express his approval of the Bill. It was founded on reciprocity of principle
between master and servant. By the present law, the master was responsible civilly-the
servant criminally. [Nevertheless][i]n all cases where, by the Act of the servant, any
injury was inflicted upon the master which could not be compensated by fine, an op
tion of imprisonment ... ought still to be left38).
A smaller group in parliament spoke against even the principle of reform.
Mr. Liddell said that he
could not agree that the House would do well to adopt the whole principle of the pres
ent Bill. That principle was the abandonment of the punitive process against the work
men and the doing away with the deterrent effect of the present law39).
Mr. Jackson added,
Was a man, having charge of an engine at a pit's mouth, who got drunk and ran away
to be dealt with merely as a debtor, though he might leave 400 or 500 fellow workmen
below in enforced idleness and in cruel uncertainty for six or seven hours? It was the
38
) Debate over Lord Elcho's bill, June 4, 1867 H a n s a r d 's Par!. Debates (1867),
CLXXXVII, col. 1607.
39
) Ibid., col. 1606.
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knowledge that under the existing law he would be dealt with very differently which
kept such a man from getting drunk and running away4°).

The weight of opinion in Parliament seems to have been that the principle
that masters and men stood on a plane ofequality should be conceded, but that
the details ofany new legislation must preserve as much ofthe old penal system
as possible. Lord Elcho 's bill was heavily amended in the course ofParliamen
tary deliberations. When it emerged from committee and was enacted into law
as the 1867 Master and Servant reform act, the new act retained much more
of the old penal law than had Lord Elcho's original bill. Employers could still
seek immediate imprisonment for "aggravated" breaches ofcontract, and for
"ordinary" breaches of contract, employers could now seek an order requiring
a worker to return to work to perform his agreement. Given that employers had
traditionally used the Master and Servant acts to force workers back to work
more often than to imprison them, this was not a large concession41 ).
Just eight years later, in 1875, a Conservative government introduced a new
bill to reform Master and Servant law, and in a Parliament elected under the
expanded suffrage, the bill received an entirely different reception than had
Lord Elcho's bill in 1867. Following suffrage reform, labor had begun to take
a more active role in electoral politics. For a number ofreasons trade unionists
had grown deeply disaffected with the Liberal government by the time the gen
eral election of 1874 was called. During the election campaign Conservative
candidates played to this antipathy in an effort to win over newly enfranchised
workers42 ). The results ofthe election of 1874 were somewhat ofa surprise, the
Conservatives won by a wide margin, and one factor in their victory seems to
have been the active hostility of organized labor toward the Liberal Party43).
It was to redeem electoral pledges to labor that the Conservative government
introduced its bill to further reform Master and Servant law in 1875.
The Conservative bill was similar in its terms to the bill Lord Elcho had
originally introduced in 1867 and which for all its limitations had been re
jected by Parliament as too radical. In 1875, however, the dominant reac
tion in Parliament was just the opposite, the government bill failed to go far
enough. Apparently, once the Conservative government made the decision
to place reform on the agenda, it set in motion a process that carried the bill
Ibid., col. 1611.
See note 15. Note 15 reports prosecutions that took place before the 1867 Master
and Servant reform act was passed.
42
) Sidn e y and Be atrice Webb, The History of Trade Unionism (London
1920), 287.
43) Ibid., 286, and Ro b e r t BI ake, Disraeli (New York 1967), 536 .
40
)
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further and further along in the direction of totally abolishing penal sanctions
for labor contract breaches.
Liberal members competed with Conservative members to outdo one an
other in currying favor with newly enfranchised working class voters. The
Liberal member Robert Lowe, who in 1866 had played a large role in the
defeat of Gladstone's bill to reform the suffrage, now objected that the gov
ernment bill unjustifiably preserved a number of penal features of the old law.
Lord Montagu joined Lowe in raising these objections. If an act is a crime,
they argued, it should be a crime whether or not the person is under contract,
and regardless of his status in life. Criminal law should impose broad legal
duties. Making breach of a labor contract an element of a crime smacked of
class legislation, singling workers out for degrading treatment just as in the
past. Lord Montagu observed that
to break a civil contract was a civil act, and we had no right to inquire into inten
tion. In the case of a minute contract [employment at will], a man at the pumping
engine of a mine might walk away without notice, immense damage might be done to
property, and yet the act would not be a criminal one. But if there was a contract for
a week, the man who should do the same act would commit a crime ... [If an act is a
crime it should be a crime regardless of whether the person is serving under a labor
contract]44).

In the course of Parliamentary deliberations the government bill was heav
ily amended pushing the resulting legislation further and further in the direc
tion of totally eliminating the penal aspects of the old Master and Servant law.
The Employers and Workmen Act of 1875 profoundly changed the terms of
English waged labor, abolishing, for all practical purposes, the power of em
ployers to use penal pressure to enforce labor agreements.
A widened suffrage, of course, was not the only factor in the passage of the
1875 act. The state of trade union organization, and labor's increasingly active
participation in electoral politics also played roles. In addition, certain mem
bers of parliament had become increasingly concerned that workers would
refuse to enter into any labor agreement other than employment at will unless
the Master and Servant law was changed. Nevertheless, an expanded suffrage
was the critical factor in this alteration of basic ground rules in English wage
labor, ground rules that henceforth prohibited, for all intents and purposes,
the use of penal pressure in wage labor.
5. C o n c l u sio n: Fre e Markets a n d Fre e Wage Labor?
This change in ground rules was the result of almost 15 years of political
struggle by organized labor, a struggle that met with great resistance until
44)

Hans a rd's Par!. Debates (1875), CCXXV: col. 656 (June 28, 1875).
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almost the last moment. English ruling elites did not spontaneously abandon
penal pressure because it was proving unprofitable. In 1875 employers pro
secuted 14,353 workers for various offences under the old Master and Servant
law just as the new law was about to take effect45 ). Employers continued to
find penal pressure of great economic benefit until the very last, until Parlia
ment compelled them to give it up as a result of the outcome of a complicated
series of political struggles. The logic of the rejection of penal coercion in
English wage labor was a political not an economic logic. And it was unequi
vocally not the spontaneous result of the introduction of free markets.
Much more research needs to be done to understand the terms and operation
of other legal regimes that governed waged labor in other countries during
the nineteenth century, but if it turns out that the English case was not atypic
al in making penal pressure available to employers, it may be that the logic
underlying the history of waged labor will also tum out to be not so different
from the logic underlying the history of modem slavery. In both cases, that is,
employers of labor would appear to have found the use of bodily compulsion
(of various degrees of severity) economically advantageous for extracting
labor services in a wide variety of market settings, and actively utilized this
type of pressure until states, for a variety of political, social or moral reasons,
intervened to force them to relinquish it.
45

20*

)

See volumes cited in note 28.

